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Essay: The Formation and evolution of Sony Ericsson alliance

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Case Study Assignment

Introduction

Sony Ericsson (SE) is a joint venture established in 2001 between Sony Corporation Japan and the Swedish telecommunications company Ericsson to make mobile phones. Both companies own 50% share of SE. The joint venture is to combine Sony’s consumer electronics expertise with Ericsson’s technological leadership and large market share in mobile communications. SE’s mission, as of October 2001, is to position itself as “the most attractive and innovative global brand in the mobile handset industry.” (Sony Ericsson, 2008) In this essay we are going to discuss the motivations that lead to the alliance, the problems of the joint venture, examine strategies used by SE and suggest alternative methods to achieve motivation.

Motivation for the Joint Venture

Sony’s main motivations for the Joint Venture were based on strategic factors: seeking Ericsson’s excellent telecommunications technology (in particular its technical wireless expertise) and market share in order to compete with the market leader, Nokia Corp. (Harris, 2001) in a market that is “so fiercely competitive” (Wood, quoted in Harris, 2001: 1). On the other hand, Ericsson’s aim was towards the acceleration of the companies’ financial and technological stance, with an ultimate aim to produce consumer electronics that would rival Nokia’s stronghold on the telecommunications industry. The combination of the two companies, sharing a common aim, would allow SE to present a range of products that were far more technologically innovative than anything available during that time.
For Ericsson, the benefits of the merge, if successful, were significant. Sony’s access to the closed Japanese market, as well as its know-how in entertainment technology and design would complement Ericsson’s mobile platform and state of the art mobile technology. Ericsson would also have access to Sony’s design and production processes. Furthermore, the imaging, music, audio and video entertainment advantages that Sony held would enable the production of new, innovative entertainment handsets, entering an untouched market. Sony President Kunitake Ando deemed the cellular handset business as one of Sony’s “key strategic areas for the future”, and vowed to make handsets one of Sony’s “key Internet-related product areas”. (Latour, 2001: 1). Sony was motivated to join Ericsson in order to expand its miniscule market share (which was making it difficult to achieve growth), and improve its position in the global handset market which had been relatively weak compared with its competitors. The handset market had been going through a “rough patch” (Dunn, 2001: 1), with the market becoming increasingly difficult to gauge, and Nokia’s dominance as the industry leader affecting the share of its competitors.
As Ericsson held nearly four times Sony’s share in the industry, and compared to Ericsson, Sony’s presence in the European market was relatively weak a partnership with Swedish Ericsson could be seen as a way to achieve growth in new regions. Perhaps the biggest problem for Ericsson was that while they produced well functioning, high quality phones, they were unable to sell them well because they didn’t cater to the tastes of consumers. Contrarily, Sony was failing to compete in the mobile phone market but was naturally able to sell its other products. The combination of the two then, could potentially prove to be a very successful venture. Ericsson was suffering from severe problems in 2000 with their market share dropping to a low of 10.7% despite the fact that Ericsson was a leader in mobile technology infrastructure. A fire in a major supply plant of telecom chip threatened to drastically slow down supply for several months, as Ericsson’s strategy was to source from one location. Product launch was disrupted and Ericsson was in dire need of help. For the three financial quarters leading to the launch of the venture, Ericsson endured losses. The venture was a lifeline for both Sony and Ericsson’s failing mobile phone divisions.
A joint venture also meant that Ericsson would bring the world’s largest existing customer base and expansive knowledge of mobile infrastructure which it operated in over 140 countries. Sony would have access to Ericsson’s cutting edge technology, and along with Sony’s competitive marketing campaigns, the partnership would bring “together complementary resources” (Sigurdson, 2004: 2) in a synergistic manner. In joining forces with Ericsson, Sony sought to broaden its “platform for mobile communications which it considers of great significance for its future presence in advanced electronics consumer products and systems” (Sigurdson, 2004: 4). For example, while Sony was capable of targeting mass markets with low-tech handsets, it was not competitive in providing networking customers with high-end products which Ericsson was. Also, Sony’s media holdings in film, games, and music would be aided by Ericsson’s links to wireless operators (Reinhardt &Djemai, 2002: 68).
The growing popularity of 3G and mobile internet technology meant the globalization of a brand, building upon the popularity of Ericsson in Europe and Sony in Japan. Sony Chief Operating Officer predicted the mobile phone industry would move towards a multi-media broadband based network where customers would demand phones capable of handling movies, games pictures and music easily. Since Sony was a world-leader in several of these areas, it was in Ericsson’s best interests to enter this merger. Although the Joint Venture was split 50:50, Latour argues that the joint venture “looks like Sony’s show” (2001:1) as the first chief executive of Sony Ericsson came from Sony and its headquarters were established in London where Sony has a larger presence. In addition, Ericsson felt that there were synergies to be gained, which would increase sales potential beyond anything either company could achieve alone.

Alternatives to a Joint Venture

The joint venture between Sony and Ericsson posed several potential problems. As suggested in (Harris, 2001) the two companies differed greatly in terms of company culture; Sony being a Japanese firm and Ericsson being a Swedish firm. On top of this many criticized the joint venture saying that it would require complex collaboration of the two companies in order to work and that it was likely to cause conflicts and inefficient management.
Despite all this however for Sony, using the transaction analysis, proved the joint venture was necessary as it gave Sony best access to Ericsson’s technological capabilities and access to the European market. This chosen route for Ericsson to forge an alliance with Sony was in order to gain entry into further international markets through Sony’s distribution channels. Furthermore it allowed Ericsson to gain access to Sony’s technology, core competencies, marketing and design capabilities as well as their management skills (ZDNET, 2002). Other options that were available to Sony and Ericsson included licensing, franchising, original equipment manufacturing (OEM) and Wholly Owned subsidiaries (WOS). However these options will be analysed below to illustrate why these were not ideal given their personal motivations.

Licensing and OEM

Licensing and OEM were an option for Sony however both raised similar obstacles. As previously mentioned the main motive for the joint venture was ‘combining Sony’s marketing savvy and Ericsson’s experience in mobile technology (in order to) challenge market leader Nokia Corp.’ (Harris, 2001) Assuming that Sony would have been able to acquire a license to some of Ericsson’s ‘mobile technology’ it potentially could allow Sony to compete better against rivals such as Nokia. Recognising this however a few major issues exist in entering a license. Firstly, Sony despite being able to gain access to Ericsson’s technology would still experienced difficultly in internalising the tacit elements of Ericsson’s capabilities and learning would be slow which is problematic given the fast pace nature of the mobile industry. Moreover Ericsson may have been reluctant to give Sony access to their technology in order to prevent Sony engaging in opportunistic learning.
Licensing was an option Ericsson could have taken as it has many benefits such as shortens the product development time, enhances the quality of products and processes, builds competitive advantage and expands existing business capabilities (Canada Business, 2007). However despite the benefits it would not have been appropriate as this strategy does not give Ericsson direct control over manufacturing, strategy and the way their technology is marketed. Ericsson could also lose control over the competitive advantage of their technological know-how. Furthermore new technology may become available making the licensed opportunity obsolete. Ultimately, licensing would not have been the suitable channel in achieving Ericsson’s motivations and business objectives.
Another strategy Ericsson could have undertaken was through OEM contracts. This would provide Ericsson with easy entry into foreign markets (Daniels, et. al. 2007). On the other hand Sony could exploit the technology transfer, learn and compete directly with Ericsson. The use of contracts needs to be established and this could be difficult in gaining the right balance that benefits both parties. Consequently, OEM contracts are not as ideal as a joint venture.

Franchising

In the case of Licensing and OEM, Sony could have been able to gain access to Ericsson’s technological ‘prowess’ however it does not provide Sony with the ‘links to wireless operators’ or access to the European markets. In a Franchising agreement Sony may have been able to grant independent operators to distribute its products. By doing so this would allow Sony low risk entry into the European market and with some careful selection could provide Sony with the local know-how and links to the local wireless operators. However given Sony’s poor global market share (1%, Dunn 2001) it is unlike that its presence in the European market would have been significant enough to successfully compete against rivals like Nokia Corp.

Wholly Owned Subsidiaries

WOS was another avenue for Ericsson. An advantage of undergoing a WOS strategy is one of technological competence. When there is technological competence WOS reduces risk over losing control (Hill, 2007: 493). This reduction of risk is important in maintaining Ericsson’s competitive advantage. WOS would also provide Ericsson with a firm control over operations in the different countries where the subsidiary does business. Despite these advantages, undertaking WOS would not have been the most beneficial avenue for Ericsson because it requires a large amount of capital as well as the risks involved for Ericsson, a European company, learning to do business in a new culture, namely the Asian/ Japanese culture. Ericsson attempting to promote its products and trying to “marry” the two cultures (host country and home country) may collide. Teaming up with an established Japanese company (Sony) through a joint venture counteracts these risks. Therefore WOS would not have been the most fitting strategy for Ericsson to take.

Problems with Sony Ericsson

With Ericsson’s contribution to cellular know-how, operator contacts and Sony’s contribution of its consumer electronics and marketing experts, (Kantrow, 2003) the formation sounded ideal. However, problems aroused however after the formation. SE underwent problems on cultural deviation, saturated markets, brand portfolio, product delays, logistic issues, supply chain management problems and rational model difficulty.
Since the establishment, SE suffered common difficulties with many joint venture companies such as uneven product line-up, violent competition, (Kantrow, 2003) and the difficulty of unifying two product lines. Sony at the beginning of the Joint Venture was producing personal digital assistance CLIE, running Palm OS. SE at that time also had plans to develop smart phones with functions similar to CLIE, running another operating system. The overlapping of products was one of the major issues that had to be dealt with.
Understanding the different management cultures both companies had and respecting it was difficult. Cultural conflicts resulted in character-based trust problems between managers of SE. The cultural differences are mentioned in Appendix 1. The differences in culture also caused delays in releasing new phones during the start of the joint venture. Moreover, the delay problem is still ongoing due to SE’s reliance on too many different technology partners. Even though licensing with them could help SE keep track with the innovation trend. (Kantrow, 2003) In 2002, it delayed the release of a mobile internet phone, resulting in less earnings possible from being a “first mover.”(Brown, 2002). The poor supply chain management caused increased transaction costs and material and services cost. Additionally, SE’s model line-up mostly consisted of high-end models. With few products in the discount segment, SE enjoyed higher-than-average selling prices but lost market share. Losses in profits were recorded.
The problem with supply chain also contributed to the delay of shipping of phones. Ericsson outsourced its handset manufacturing to Singapore inefficiently. After blending Sony’s handset business, difficulties occurred in meeting delivery schedules. (Durman, 2004) In 2004, Miles Flin, then CEO of SE tackled the problem by putting more control over manufacturing and supply chain, but the result was not as good as expected. (Jennifer, 2007) Furthermore, SE has been unable to create a strong presence within the American market, with its phones reported to be difficult to be found in the market. (Hughlett & Benderoff, 2007). SE also has shut down its CDMA R&D site in North America, reflecting the company’s poor performance in the region. (Omatseye & Dano, 2003)
SE was also facing slowing growth and downturn in profits. These lead to other problems referred in Appendix 2. Another problem was the rational model that SE applied within the company. SE believed planning and decision should start from the top to the bottom, with management agreeing on the objectives which are determined on a long term base. However, the time it takes to complete a decision might hurt SE as there are dynamic changes in the environment. The Rational model is too rigid and restricts innovation. Nevertheless, it is hard more or less to predict long term developments of the mobile industry.
Lastly, both CEO’s of Ericsson and Sony have respectively in 2002 and 2008 stated that it had intentions to end the joint venture if predicted earnings are not achieved. The lack of commitment from both companies will hurt trust, especially the process-based trust amongst both organizations.

Evolution of a long-term strategy

Using the Porter’s five-force analysis (PFF) and resource-based view (RBV) we can examine the strategies used. The functions of the above analysis are mentioned in Appendix 3.
SE only held 5.4% of the global market in 2003 whilst Nokia held 34.5%. (Mollman, 2003) Of the six leading phone companies, SE is in the last place. The recent profit crash in 2008 mentioned further emphasized how risky its strategy is. To further increase market share globally, SE has adopted a multinational strategy, by releasing phones exclusive to a specific regions (The BRAVIA-branded line of phones, for Japan only.) It has also signed agreements to release network exclusive phones with network providers. (The TM series are phones exclusive to the T-Mobile USA network.) SE aims to expand in the US; hence it has also signed distribution deals with AT&T to increase its market share. In the long run, this should be beneficial to SE’s aim to increase market share.
SE has adopted the UIQ operating systems in its Smartphone, even though it is less popular compared to Windows Mobile. UIQ Technology is jointly owned by SE and Motorola. It develops and licenses open software platform for the mobile industry. The strategy SE adopts allows overall cost of development to be reduced, greater flexibility in application development and reduces payments of licensing fee to Microsoft. However, the lack of full vertical integration does not help SE create competitive advantage, and the operating system SE has invested in only dominates a small percentage of the market share and can be easily substituted. SE does not have a competitive advantage like Apple since Apple engineers the handset, the operating system as well as the default applications. (Sydney Morning Herald, 2008) SE in 2008, announced the “XPERIA X1” which is the companies’ first Windows Mobile operating system phone. (Sony Ericsson to do first windows phone, 2008). The strategy to adopt what is popular currently will definitely help with market share, but not being the “first mover” in the industry, greatly affects the earnings available from the product, as there are many rivalry products. Windows Mobile operating system was introduced in 2001.
Long from the beginning of the joint venture, SE’s strategy was to offer superior quality and design in order to charge a premium. (Mollman, 2003) By focusing on niche markets, SE has put great efforts on developing entertainment handsets in the dynamic market. SE focuses on entertainment components design and development. (Carson, 2006) This differentiation strategy is effective in the short term as the bargaining power of SE was high. It has formed a strong competitive advantage for SE to gain strong market positions in the increasing demand of fashion and multimedia phones. Existing rivalries such as Samsung and Nokia cannot imitate their services immediately as the focus of the companies differ. As for new entrants, SE has more experiences where it enjoys a competitive advantage over R&D costs and skills.
The current product market strategy SE adopts is to design and launch unique new handsets to satisfy the customer needs and obtain more market share. However, the handset market is changeable, in order to be successful in the long run, SE will have to develop new technologies. However, those technological resources are neither scares nor non-replicable. In addition to the short product life cycle in phone industry and the fast catching up by rivals, providing high-end phones only is no longer a sustainable strategy in the long term. (Durman, 2003).
Some analysts also said SE should offer more cost effective low-end phones to compensate the lower selling volume in the high-end market. (Mollman, 2003) In addition, consumer’s purchases of low-end phones are greater in sales than high-end phones. The high-end market in Western Europe, in which SE is heavily relying on, is saturated and highly competitive. (Harris, 2001) It is difficult for SE to squeeze further profits. To cater for aggressive growth, SE has reconfigured its value chain and decided to adopt forward integration, and operate retail stores, to allow consumers to touch and use the phone prior to purchasing it. (Sony Ericsson to open store in central London, 2006). This strategy allows a different sales approach, as it allows consumers to experience “the very best of the Sony Ericsson brand.” In 2007, knowing that SE had less experience in developing low-end phones, SE and Sagem Communication entered into licensing and ODM agreements concerning entry-level GSM, GPRS & EDGE mobile phones. (Sony Ericsson to outsource handset manufacturing to Sagem Communications, 2007). SE hopes the agreement with Sagem will help increase its low-end phone product range and market share. However, the vice president of SE, Kazuo Nakai, took a different view. He supported the old strategy as it demonstrates the objectives of the company – to offer quality and design. (Mollman, 2003), SE is adopting a global area structure and entering emerging markets such as India and China, where it has opened design centres to further increase local responsiveness. (BusinessWeek, 2008) He also has great confidence on the competitive advantage of SE in Japan over Nokia. Since Japan is the most advanced phone market in the world, it gives SE a unique advantage to adopt their technologies and thus producing cutting-edge phones. (BusinessWeek, 2008). These resources are perfectly immobile and gives SE a sustainable advantage in the long term.

Conclusion

As seen from the above discussion, there were multiple reasons why both companies wanted to forge the alliance. Whether SE’s strategies to the problems since the formation would be a success in the long term depends on the dynamic markets. There are always opportunities and risks around, especially in the constantly changing markets of the mobile industry.

APPENDIX

Appendix 1
Central to the Japanese is the concept of “groupism” (Hayashi, 1990; Kanfman, 1975) Collective needs and goals of all employees are more important than individual needs in Japanese management. Whist in Sweeden, a certain competitive nature remains within individuals. An essential characteristic of the Swedish management style is it very decentralized and democratic nature.
Appendix 2
The consolidated financial summary for Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications AB (Sony Ericsson) for the first quarter ended March 31, 2008 is as follows:
Q1 2007  Q4 2007   Q1 2008
Number of units shipped (million)            21.8       30.8          22.3
Sales (Euro m.)                                       2,925      3,771       2,702
Gross Margin %                                     30.3%     31.8%      29.2%
Operating Income (Euro m.)                   346          489          181
Operating Income (%)                            11.8%     13.0%       6.7%
Income Before Taxes (Euro m.)              362          501          193
Net income (Euro m.)                             254          373          133
Average Sales Price (Euro)                     134          123          121
Table 1: Consolidated Financial Summary of Sony Ericsson
Source: “Sony Ericsson reports second quarter results”
Recently, the first quarter of 2008 showed that company’s profit crashed by 43% to �133 million, sales down 8% and global shares down from 9.4 to 7.9%, despite SE admitting the handset market is expected to grow 10 per cent in 2008. SE’s president Hideki Komiyama admitted that the European sales had contributed much of the decline. Compared to its rival, Nokia, SE “has a relatively high exposure to Western Europe and dependence on sales of high-end phones, The Western Europe “market is clearly the weakest globally today and seems to be heading for another year-on-year decline in units and revenues in the second quarter,” (Dresdner Kleinwort) whereas Nokia has a strong position in the low-end segment and emerging markets, as well as being a major supplier of fancier handsets.” (Big Trouble at Sony Ericsson). The Western Europe market was already saturated in which the demand for high-ends phones was lower. Japan and US was also under this situation. (Harris, 2001) However, SE’s heavy focus was still on its stylish and innovation. Although SE addressed its narrow portfolio problem by licensing more hardware and software technologies to launch more cost-effective low-end phones and mid-range phones and developing new markets aiming to build more market shares, SE still could not meet economies of scale like Nokia which are crucial to expansion. (Jennifer, 2007;Brown, 2002). Nokia’s economies of scale and global distribution for phones are priced at $30 or less. (BusinessWeek, 2007) A thorough value chain analysis of SE suggests they have no such cost advantage in this area. High Distribution price was also another impediment. The old strategy of SE by offering superior quality and design in order to gain competitive advantage is no longer successful in modern phone industry where short product life cycle is necessary.
SE issued a second warning of profit crash in 2008, indicating it will not likely see a profit in the second quarter of 2008. “SE had difficulty to achieve good sales for its mid and high-end mobile phone series in Europe, with slow shipment for low-end series”. The recent profit losses highlight more problems that SE has faced since the joint venture. Such problems include logistics and marketing. Logistics problems basically involve work flows and releasing products “at the right price to the right customers in the right time” as the privilege of efficient and effective access to customers was lost since the joint venture. (Kantrow, 2003)
Appendix 3
PFF primarily concerns the sources of competitive advantages which includes discussion on rivalry among existing firms, threat of potential new entrants, threat of substitute products/services, and bargaining power of suppliers and bargaining power of buyers. Whether a company’s strategy can sustain its competitive advantages and thus leading to a long term success depends on the rareness, mobility, limitability and substitutability of its resources and capabilities. According to the RBV, in order to develop a competitive advantage the firm must have resources and capabilities that are superior to those of its competitors.

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