After the appointment of Ahmet Davutolu as as foreign minister in May 2009, the Turkish government has engaged in more active foreign relations in its surrounding regions where the EU’s relationship with Turkey has turned into a ‘vicious circle’, due to a growing mutual distrust.
Turkey began to experience serious problems with all its neighbours with the Arab Spring which started in Tunisia in 2010 and spread to almost all Arab countries in the Mediterranean region.With the eruption of the Syrian crisis and its transformation into a civil war the policy of zero problems with the neighbors completely collapsed. Far from ‘zero problems’ Turkey finds itself with too many diplomatic crises and national security problems. The policy was gradually replaced by a policy of "no neighbors without problems."
Turkey, whose relations with Syria had been friendly over the last decade, condemned Assad over the violent crackdown and has requested his departure from office. Syria and Turkey significantly worsened after Syrian forces shot down a Turkish fighter jet in June 2012 and border clashes in October 2012.
The war next door has been political, economic, sectarian, and security reflections that required close U.S. and EU cooperation with Turkey.
Considering the changing behaviour of Turkish foreign policy, the research question of this project is ‘what is driving Turkey to pursue a new security strategy in Syrian border against aggression or migration flows. Special attention is made to NATO support in terms of military aggression, and EU assistance on matters of migration. ‘how the EU and NATO led Turkey’s new security strategy in Syrian border against aggression or migration flows / Under the influence of EU and NATO ‘ what are the reasons of Turkey to pursue a new security strategy in Syrian border? (hangi soru?
Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist thinking is utilized to understand the behaviour of Turkish foreign policy. The EU normative power approach is also applied to increase the explanatory power of the theory.
The hypothesis to be tested is that there is a ‘new’ Turkish security strategy in Syrian border following the Syrian conflict in 2011. The new security strategy is concerned with two main conditions. The international political structure which led Turkey to pursue a new security strategy and Turkey’s interests in terms of security concerns.
This study assesses Turkey’s revision of its security strategy after Syrian conflict by taking account the international political structure.
The thesis consists of ”..chapters.The first chapter surveys the historical context and critical evaluation of the Turkish foreign policy in Syria without ignoring its EU candidate status. The second chapter includes two sub-headings. The first sub-heading asses EU Syria Policy and the Impact of the European Union’s Syria Policy on Turkey and the second sub-heading assess NATO relations. The third chapter introduces the theoretical framework that the ‘neo-realism’ and ‘EU normative power ‘ approach. The fourth chapter tests the given hypothesis as Turkey pursues a new security strategy according to these theories. This chapter includes two sub-headings. The first sub-heading deals with the international political structure which led Turkey to pursue a new security strategy and the second one deals with Turkey’s interests in terms of security concerns.
In conclusion, the aim of this project is to illustrate the reasons of the security strategy change by taking account the EU and NATO’s influence and explain them by using the theories that it introduces.
As Waltz notes , it is the external pressures that shape the making of foreign policies, and they dictate the international conditions that the national policies have to cope with (Waltz 1979: 72).
It is mainly a library-based study with an extensive focus on primary and secondary literature in English and Turkish. Included, is personal correspondence with academics with Turkish foreign policy expertise.
Furthermore, the case studies utilize commentaries/analyses from the quality press, and extensive reference is made to the official/unofficial policy briefs/analysis papers/reports.
Key words. Security, Neorealism, NATO, EU, Military aggression, Normative power, Migration flow
Historical overview
Turkey-Syria Relations
Syrian’Turkish relations have long been strained including the self annexation of the Hatay Province to Turkey in 1939, water disputes resulting from the Southeastern Anatolia Project, Syria’s support for the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (abbreviated as PKK) and Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (abbreviated as ASALA) which have been recognised as a terrorist organisation by NATO, EU, and many other countries.
The signing of Adana Agreement on 20 October 1998 marked a turning point in relations between Turkey and Syria. The agreement established cooperation against PKK terrorist organization and relations subsequently flourished in many aspects.
Syrian President Bashar Assad’s visit to Turkey in 6-8 January 2004 was the first visit to Turkey by a Syrian president. In addition to enhanced cooperation through several bilateral agreements on economic and trade relations, military and security issues, energy politics, transportation, culture, tourism and agriculture; Turkish-Syrian Freetrade Agreement in January 2007 has been sample developments in bilateral relations.
The signing of Joint Political Declaration on establishing High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC) during President Assad’s visit to Turkey in September 2009 was another milestone in Turkish Syrian relations.
Prime Minister Erdo??an also made a visit to Syria in December 2009.He outlined his vision of Turkey becoming Syria’s economic gateway to Europe, and Syria becoming Turkey’s gateway to the Arab world. He also supported the free movement of goods, services and people between the two countries and throughout the region.
Before the Syrian civil war Erdo??an and al-Assad were described by The Economist as "the best of friends".
However in 2011 the relationship between the two countries was strained following the outbreak of conflict in Syria. Turkey hoped to help transform Syria into a democracy and kept its dialogue with both the regime and opposition. Bashar al Assad was told to introduce political reforms, legalize opposition parties, and prepare the country for free elections.
Prime Minister Erdo??an urged President al-Assad to be extremely sensitive about the conflict. Erdo??an noted that if such a massacre is carried out once again like Hama, Syria cannot deal with its consequences as the international community will display a harsh reaction. And, in such a situation, Turkey will have to fulfil our responsibilities.
Ankara grew increasingly critical of Syria’s response and made a choice by siding with the opposition and change.
The developments in Syria created difficult circumstances for Turkey. Besides border security concerns, a huge number of refugees from Syria led political and economic burdens.
Turkey’s concern on military aggression and migration flow from Syria supported by with its long-time allies in the West: the European Union and the United States.
Turkey has requested an urgent meeting of the NATO alliance to discuss the shootdown of one of their fighters and Syria’s firing on a second aircraft in June and asked NATO to deploy Patriot air-defense missiles on its territory On 4 December 2012.
Meanwhile hundreds of thousands of people have fled Syria for Turkey to escape the uprising against President Assad. The president of The Disaster and Emergency Relief Agency (AFAD) of Turkey Dr. Fuat Oktay declared the number of Syrian accomodated in Turkey exceeded 700 thousand, 218 thousand of whom are staying in camps.
Turkish Foreign Policy Syrian Policy zero problem doctrine
Turkish foreign policy under the AKP administration has been associated with the name of Ahmet Davuto??lu. Davuto??lu was the chief foreign policy advisor of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo??an before he was appointed foreign minister in 2009. As an academic, Davuto??lu outlined his foreign policy doctrine about Turkey in his book ‘Strategic Depth,’ published in 2001.
The main objective of the strategy was to establish Turkey as a Great Power not only in the region, but also on a global level. He argues that Turkey possesses ‘strategic depth’ due to its history and geographic position and lists Turkey among a small group of countries which he calls ‘central powers’.
According to Davuto??lu,Turkey is situated in the centre of the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Eurasia. Thereby, it is neither a peripheral country nor a country on the borders of the European Union, NATO and Asia.
It is important to mention that the former policy agenda of the AKP government was already formulated by former Minister of Foreign Affairs, ??smail Cem. Cem had criticized the lack of historical and cultural element in Turkish foreign policy and referred to the the need to improve regional ties, broaden foreign policy interests into far regions, and make more effective use of Turkey’s Ottoman heritage. He also insisted the need for ”systemic and vigorous addition of a historical dimension to bilateral relations with (those) states which share a common Ottoman past.”
He was the architect of Turkey’s EU membership finally given full membership candidacy status by the EU in 1999 Helsinki Summit. Maybe the most important event in Cem’s tenure in office as Turkish Foreign Minister was the capture of PKK leader Abdullah ??calan and the Adana Agreement made between Turkey and Syria.
The AKP government expanded the foreign policy agenda of Turkey as an outcome of ??smail Cem’s vision.
Davuto??lu set out Turkish foreign policy thinking in a 2009 speech.
The geographical uniqueness of Turkey is ‘ right at the centre of Afro-Eurasia ‘ through this geographical continuity ‘ you can have an access to many regions at the same time. This is what I call ‘strategic depth’. Is it an asset? From my perspective, it is a great asset ‘ We tried to develop a zero-problem policy with our neighbours. We cannot afford continuous tensions with our neighbours ‘We have to keep our channels open to everybody. In the Middle East, for example, there are certain compartmentalizations: Shiites, Sunnis, radical-moderate states, problems between Arabs and Israel or Israel and Iran, problems between individual countries, problems inside countries like Shiites-Sunnis in Iraq, or Fatah-Hamas in Palestine or Hezbollah and Hariri in Lebanon; but there is one country that has channels open to everybody and that has good relations with everybody. It is Turkey. And we will keep this position.
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davuto??lu indicated five operational principles as; balance between freedom and security, zero problems with the neighbors, to develop relations with the neighboring regions and beyond, multi-dimensional foreign policy and rhythmic diplomacy.
Aras described Davuto??lu’s ‘strategic depth’ doctrine as a theory of geopolitics ‘ a theory of manufacturing a strong state. Aras explained ‘Davuto??lu provides ideational and material practices geared to create a strong state based on Turkey’s unique history and geography.’.
As part of the ‘strategic depth’ doctrine, AKP has sought good relations with its neighbors by using the country’s Ottoman heritage as a foreign policy asset. The princibles which articulated in the pre-Arab Spring period aimed at taking advantage of Turkey’s strategic geography between Europe and Asia and promoting good-neighbourly ties by exerting ‘soft power’ in its region.
While Turkey retain ties with the European Union, it will also maintaining the security umbrella offered by NATO membership. However, more focus was on the Caucuses, Central Asia, and most importantly, the Middle East.
The Arab Spring and the outbreak of the Syrian uprising has strained the country’s relations with its former allies and posed economic, political, and security challenges. The ‘new’ Turkish Foreign policy vision based on the ‘zero problems with neighbors’ strategy also faced a dramatic challenge.
The general opinion in foreign policy discussions has been that Arab Spring would have a serious impact on the ‘zero problems with neighbours policy. While some believe in that the Arab Spring brought to the end of zero problem policy, Mr Davuto??lu stresses that an approach based on hard power and realpolitik cannot be an effective response to the Arab Spring and underscores the fact that the zero problems policy is alive and needed for the process.
However this chapter will concentrate the effects of zero-problem policy on relations with Turkey and Syria rather than to discuss the fate of this policy.
As Keyman argues ‘the zero problem policy finished at the beginning of Arap Spring starting from Tunisia, come to light in Egypt and giving warning signals in Libya but the foreign policy decision-makers did not understand the fact at early stage and correctly identify’.
The events during the Arap Spring restricted Turkey’s room to maneuver, and disproved the possibility of a smooth execution of foreign policy right from the beginning.
Keyman also notes that ‘despite the international community contribute to the Arab Spring, Turkey could not understand early that the international actors would not-could not- especially intervene in Syria on a multilateral basis’.
Turkey’s drive for ‘zero problems with its neighbors’ required active support from the EU and the United States. Neither the EU nor the US appeared to have the ability or desire to pursue a strategy for the regime change in the Syria case.
Turkey kept pursuing overly ambitious strategic ambitions and interfered to trigger regime change and could not foresee that the EU and US intervention have been limited and they would not interfere in Syria conflict on the basis of regime change.
As a result Turkish foreign policy became isolated
Another point Turkey overlooked that Assad regime will be strengthened with the support of Russia, Iran and China.
As Phillips points outs that ‘the government’s critics in Turkey argue that Erdo??an and Davuto??lu greatly over-estimated their real influence with Assad.’
Turkey did not foresee the ability of the regime to remain in power. Soli ??zel, a columnist for the Turkish daily Haberturk, notes that Turkey’s leadership was na??ve, failing to realize that reform was a matter of life and death for the Assad regime.
On the other hand the conflict forced Turkey into closer contact with the United States. Turkey agreed to station a NATO missile defense shield on its southern border. This also constituted a complicating factor to perform the zero-problem policy in the neighborhood.
In the Arab Spring and in particular during the crisis in Syria, Turkey did not possess the capacity to achieve regime change through the use of hard power or to establish a regional order. Turkey does not have capacity to influence Russia and Iran either especially in the presence of a weak international community.
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As Keyman notes Turkey’s foreign policy approached to the Syria conflict in a manner that the ‘EU perspective have abandoned, multilateralism and democratic reform process have forgotten’. Consequently an unstable image of Turkey revealed.
As Cengiz ??andar notes ‘With the eruption of the Syrian crisis and its transformation into a civil war and regional proxy conflict, Turkey’s "zero problems with neighbors" policy was gradually replaced by a policy of "no neighbors without problems." This wasn’t actually a choice of a new policy but a total reversal of the original policy. This near-180 degree turn of Turkey’s regional policy has inspired regular ironic remarks…. Despite its unpromising foreign policy outlook, Turkey is persistently trying to "reset" its foreign policy.ref
T??rkiye ile AB aras??nda Suriye’deki ayaklanman??n mahiyetine y??nelik g??r’? ayr??l” bulunmaktad??r. Esed Rejimi Suriye’deki ayaklanman??n S??nni Araplar taraf??ndan ba??lat??ld”n?? ve sonra da M??sl??man Karde??ler taraf??ndan teslim al??nd”n?? etkili bir propaganda olarak kullanmaktad??r. Maalesef, Bat??l?? h??k??metler de bu propagandaya ikna olmu??lard??r. Buna g??re M??sl??man Karde??ler, ??lkedeki Gayr?? M??slim az??nl’?a kar’? bir sava?? y??r??tmektedir. Bat??l?? ??lkeler de Esed Rejimi’ni devirerek ‘??slamc?? bir y??netim’ kurulmas??na ??nayak olmak istemediklerinden m??dahale etme konusunda isteksiz davranmaktad??rlar. Bu durum pek ??ok a’?dan T??rkiye’yi tehdit etmektedir.
Suriye merkezli geli??meler, zorlu bir s??re??ten ge??en T??rkiye-ABD ili??kileri a’?s??ndan da ??nemli oldu. Ancak T??rk-Amerikan ili??kileri a’?s??ndan as??l gerginlik noktas?? Gezi olaylar?? oldu.
May??s ay?? sonlar??nda ba??layan Gezi Park?? olaylar??, T??rkiye’nin, demokrasi, insan haklar??, ifade ??zg??rl” gibi temel de??erleri payla??t” Bat?? d??nyas??yla ili??kilerini temelden sarst??.model olarak g??r??n??n ??lke ‘..
Ba??bakan Erdo??an’??n AB’den giderek daha fazla ??ikayet ederken, ??angay Be??lisi olarak bilinen ??angay ‘?birli??i ??rg??t’??ne kat??lma mesajlar?? vermesi de so??uk kar’?land??.
EU Migration Policy in Syria Civil War and Impact on Turkey
AB’nin Suriye ‘? Sava’?nda Uygulad” G’? Politikas?? ve T??rkiyeye Etkisi
Turkey shares its longest common border with Syria; various geographic and historical links also tie the two neighboring states together. The instability in the region will directly effect Turkey beyond the common history and neighborly relations. The migration waves is the first example of this influence. This issue is not only concern for Turkey but also for the border security of EU. Turkey is required to be used as a bridge for the transition for arrivals and departures who want to join the ranks of Al-Qaeda from the EU member states also.
On the other hand, the opening of accession negotiations with the EU cannot be explained without taking into account Turkey’s strategic importance in an increasingly insecure world. Turkey is not only a security asset for the EU; it also has the ability to harbour Islam with modernity and democracy which played a significant role in the December 2004 decision (Keyman 2009: 37).
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), has formalized a series of agreements and institutional links between EU and Syria since 2003.The plans which have been adopted to strengthen the prosperity, stability and security was at the same time expressing the strategic objectives of the European foreign policy and security ambitions.
Since violence and repression broke out in Syria in March 2011, the EU has called repeatedly for an end to attacks and urges the authorities to exercise restraint. The European Union has applied economic sanctions to put pressure on the
existing regime to undertake reform.
Negotiations on an Association Agreement were frozen in May 2011, while bilateral cooperation programmes under the European Neighbourhood Policy have been suspended. Participation in the EU’s regional programmes by Syrian authorities has also been suspended, and the European Investment Bank has deferred all loans and technical assistance to Syria.
The EU became the supporter of Geneva talks with the UN, Arab League, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation to find a political solution of the conflict by bringing together the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition to discuss the steps towards a transitional government.
As Seeberg notes’ the lack of societal and institutional development in Syria and added to that the European perception of Syria as a radical Arab state in regional as well as in international politics have created obstacles for the EU in approaching Syria’.
The EU has provided ‘843 million in humanitarian assistance for emergency relief, food assistance, water, sanitation, shelter, logistics, protection and more.However the EU criticized not to even agree on a common position and offer much more than encouraging words.
Syrians have become the most detected nationality on the Eastern Mediterranean route since the second half of 2012.
The war in Syria is currently the single most important factor contributing to forced migration flows across the Middle Eastern region, with the number of Syrian refugees growing at a frightening rate: while some 600 000 refugees were registered in early 2013, the tally had grown to more than 2.5 million by February 2014.
Accordingto UN figures, 6.5 million Syrians have been displaced by the civil war, and 2.5 million are registered as refugees. Lebanon has taken the highest number of refugees, followed by Jordan and Turkey.
The number of Syrian accomodated in Turkey exceeded 700 thousand, 218 thousand of whom are staying in camps.The expenditures made by Turkey in this context is around 2.5 billion USD.
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