An Encoding-Based Technique To Prevent Sql Injection Attacks

In recent years, SQL injection attacks pose a common and serious security threat to web

applications: they allow attackers to obtain unrestricted access to the database underlying the applications and to the potentially sensitive information these database contain, and it is becoming

significantly more popular amongst hackers. According to recent research, there has been an

increased attempt of this attack type. As one can imagine, attacker gaining administrator access

to server means e ectively loss of all of the data on that server to the invader. Worse yet there is

now a beachhead behind your firewall from which attacks on other server and services can now

be made. In this way SQL injection can provide access to all company or personal data. In the

web environment, end -user privacy is one of the most controversial legal issues, therefore, all

types of SQL injections which are dangerous for the components of the web application must be

prevented. In this project, we have presented a review of di erent types of SQL injections and

illustrated how to use them to perform attacks. we also surveyed existing techniques against SQL

injection attacks and analyzed their advantages and disadvantages. Thus our aim is to provide

increased security by developing a light weighted technique which prevents illegal access to the

database and overcome disadvantages of previously existing techniques.


Chapter 1

Introduction to SQL Injection Attacks

SQL injection is one of the major issues that belongs to the category of code injection

problems. According to the report by the White Hat on web security vulnerabilities 2011,

it shows that nearly 15 out of 100 web application attacks account for SQL Injection [18].

An SQL injection is a kind of injection vulnerability in which the attacker tries to inject

arbitrary pieces of malicious data into the input fields of an application, which, when

processed by the application, causes that data to be executed as a piece of code by the back

end SQL server, thereby giving undesired results which the developer of the application

did not anticipate. SQL injection vulnerabilities are caused by software applications

that accept data from an untrusted source (internet users), fail to properly validate and

sanitize the data, and subsequently use that data to dynamically construct an SQL query

to the database backing that application. Query is constructed by concatenating an

input string directly from the User, the query behaves correctly only if input contains

no malicious string. Using this attack, the attacker can create, up-date, retrieve or delete

any data, depending upon the access specification allowed through the application

code. In addition, the attack can have severe consequences like executing administration

operations on the database [13] or recovering the content present on the DBMS.

For example, suppose a database contains user names and passwords, and the un-3

derlying application contains the following code:

query = ' SELECT  FROM emp WHERE username =


' +

request: getParameter('username') + '


AND password =


' +

request: getParameter('password') + '



This query is used to authenticate the user who tries to login to the web site, by checking

username and password against data stored in the database. However, if a malicious

user enters '










' into the username field, the query string submitted to

the database would be:


username =

0 0








0 0

AND password =

0 0


Since the atomic formula








is a tautology, the user will bypass the check, and

authentication will be successful.

Definition 1 (Web Application) We can abstract a web application P : h

; ::::; 

i ! 


a mapping from user inputs (over an alphabet ) to query strings (over ). In particular, P is

given by fh f1; :::; f


i; hs

1; :::; s


ig where





is an input filter,




is a constant string.

The argument to P is an n-tuple of input strings hi1; :::; i


i and P returns a query q = q

1 + ::: + q


where, for 1  j  l,


j ,














s wheres 2 fs

1; :::; s



f (i) where f 2 f f1; :::; f

ng ^ i 2 fi1; :::; i



That is, each q j

is either a static string or a


filtered input.

Definition 2 (SQL Command Injection Attack) Given a web application P and an input

vector hi1; :::; i


i, the following SQL query:

q = P(i1; :::; i



constructed by P is an SQL injection attack (SQLIA) if the following conditions hold:

 The query string q has a valid parse tree Tq ,

 There exists k such that 1  k  n and f

k (i

k ) is a substring in q and is not a valid syntactic

form in Tq .

In this thesis, we have proposed an encoding-based technique to prevent SQL injection attacks. In particular, the proposal works in following phases:

1. We will design an encoding function which respects the homomorphic property

w:r :t: SQL basic operations.

2. We will transform the original version of queries into semantically equivalent form

applying encoding functions before appending inputs to the queries.

3. Finally conversion of result to unicode domain if required.

The structure of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes various type

of attack chapter 3 describes available related works in the literature. Chapter 4 and

subsequent chapters describes Proposed Approach ....


Chapter 2

SQL Injections Attacks and their types

SQL injection belongs to the category of code injection attacks. This attack can be

classified into di erent types based on the manner in which the malicious content is

added to the original query.

2.0.1 Tautology

An atomic formula that always holds true is called tautology. This type of attack can be

performed by injecting an input such that condition in where clause becomes tautology

in the resultant query. The attacker can use the SQL keyword OR to perform this type

of attack. Consider a Log in application that accepts username and password from the

user for authentication . Generic Log in query for authentication can be written as :

$query='Select * from members where username=' '+$userName+'' AND password=' ' +$password+''';

If the attacker enters '










' as username and enters some random

value for password , the resulting query would be:


Select * from members where userName='










AND $password=' ';

The condition check in resulting query will always be true since ' ' will comment

out the password check condition in where clause transforming the where clause into a

tautology [7]. On executing this query, the database will return all data entries of members table. Since the query returns a non-null value, the attacker will be authenticated

to log in .

2.0.2 Union-based Attack

In this type of attack, the attacker injects a malicious input such that resultant query becomes Union of two SQL queries suppose the attacker enters the input '


UNION Select 

from members where userName =




' in the userName field and enters some

random value in the password field .At run time final query will look some like this.

Select * from members where username=' ' UNION Select * from USER

where userName='bharat' AND password=' ';

The resulting query will reveal all the private data of the user with username as

bharat if bharat is valid username .

2.0.3 Logically Incorrect Queries

This is a most useful SQL injection attack which may not alter the database but can be

very useful to get information about the database.The attacker enters malicious string

in such a manner such that query string becomes incorrect according to SQL Grammer

resulting origin of some error messages, when executed on database server.These error messages can be useful enough for attacker to gain valuable information about the

database such as table name , column name or their data types . Single quotes can be very


helpful to perform these type of attacks. The attacker can enter an input like 'o'rian' in

the username field and some random value for password . Resultant query at run time

will look something like this.

Select * from members where username=' O'rian 'AND password='random';

We can see that resultant query is incorrect .So when input is appended and query is

sent to the database layer database will throw some error which can reveal information

such as table,their columns ,their datatypes , some part of code involved in this operation.

This might be useful for the attacker to get information about the type of database in use

and its tables, and can help him to easily perform the more attacks described here. thus

programmers are advised to handle all errors and exceptions in application itself so that

attacker can not get any error or exception message.

2.0.4 Alternate Encoding

A defensive Approach to prevent SQLIA will be to filter single quote but attacker can still

attack by using alternate mechanisms to encode and add malicious input to the query.

He can user various availbale encoding schemes like ASCII, hexadecimal[14] instead of

directly using single quote or other malicious input . For example, char(39) represents

the ASCII character for single quote, which is a intelligent way to inject semicolon in the

query instead of directly putting the single quote character.

2.0.5 Inference

This type of attack are useful to gain knowledge about the database state . The attacker

can inject Select-Case style statements to per-form timing based delay attacks, these

timing based delay attacks can help him to get some information about current state of

the database.


2.0.6 Piggy-backed Queries

An interesting idea would be to insert a completely new query by piggybacking it over

the intended query, rather than appending it with the intended query.Here Attacker is

not modifying the query rather than he is inserting his own query to alter the database.

operator to separate two queries in SQL is semicolon. If the attacker inputs any random

value in the username , and enters ' ; Drop table members;' . At Runtime query will be

following :

Select * from members where username=' ' AND password=' '; Drop table members;

The other query is inserted with the intended query, and both queries are sent to

database for execution . After execution of these queries , the member table is deleted

from the database.Some databases don't allow two queries to execute simultaneously

like oracle.thus these type of attacks depends on database platform.

2.0.7 Stored Procedure Attacks

Programmers have common belief that stored procedures are a useful mechanism to

prevent SQLIA. However, these store procedures are also vulnerable . Attacker can get

information about the code and other data with the help of logically incorrect queries

execution . This code-data can be used along with a combination of tautology and piggybacked query to perform an attack on Application. Using this attack, Attacker can insert

his own code to execute in application thus attacker can be successful in crashing the

application by putting some junk code he can crash the database or he can shutdown

the database by the help of this type of attacks.


Chapter 3

Related Works

Several approaches are proposed in the past to countermeasure SQL injection attacks.some

approaches are based on static code analysis some are completely dynamic others use

combination of both. Let us look at each with there advantages and disadvantages.

3.0.8 Dynamic Query Matching

The dynamic query matching approach [5] generates a SQL master file, which contains

all valid queries that are intended to be generated by the application. An XML is created

at run time which contains all the queries generated during run time and this XML

is matched with already existing master file. This approach can prevent SQLIA since

modified query will not be present in the master file and the XML Matching module

would detect possible attack.

3.0.9 Analysis Framework for Web Application Security

The approach presented by the paper [17] creates a finite state automaton based on

dynamic time query generated by the application. Idea is to define expected value of

input for any intended query by this finite state automaton . So basically this method

is based on input validation and depends on how application filters user input . Some


drawbacks also demonstrated such as this approach validates the query based on its

syntax, and but does not takes semantic validation in account . Also, the solution

does not supports all SQL operators such as this does not supports the 'like' operator.

The technique is completely theoretical, and requires some experimental evaluation for

e ectiveness measure.

3.0.10 Instruction Set Randomization

It [2] proposes that the SQL keywords should be appended with the some random

numbers generated by the randomization algorithm. Attempt For SQLIA fails because

constructed keywords are completely random and attacker has no idea about it so he

can not successfully alter the query structure(query modification required keywords).

This algorithm requires a proxy server to validate query based on new Grammar and

de-randomise keywords to send actual query to database layer.if query structure is valid

according to new grammar keyword are de-randomised and sent to database layer else

attempt to SQLIA is prevented . However, introducing proxy server for randomization

and de-randomization adds significant performance overhead.

3.0.11 Frameworks for SQL Retrieval on Web Application Security

This approach [9] basically works in two modules - Pattern Creation Module (PCM)

and Attack Detection Module (ADM). Pattern Creation Module (PCM) creates a model

of attacks based on the attack patterns from previous attacks.Then Attack Detection

Module (ADM) checks if the query constructed by the application at run time matches

created pattern by PCM Module. It is some kind of signature based Approach if the

attacker performs a new type of attack that does not match an existing available pattern,

the attack will be successful, and this mechanism will fail.


3.0.12 CANDID

CANDID [1] stands for Candidate Evaluation for Discovering Intent Dynamically. This

approach dynamically checks the intended query structure with run time generated

query .It proposes to run the web application on candidate inputs that are benign.

However, thus not a practical approach because the problem of finding candidate inputs

is undecidable.

3.0.13 AMNESIA

This approach [8] a hybrid approach uses combination of static code analysis and dynamic monitoring . In the static phase, a model is created based on all the queries that

are intended to be generated by the application. Model creation requires source code

which may not be present if application is developed by some third party. In the second

phase which is dynamic phase, the query built during run-time is validated against the

model built during the static phase.

3.0.14 Automated Fix Generation to secure SQL Statements

This approach identifies known vulnerable SQL statements generates a e ective solution

to fix and then replaces this vulnerability with the new fix code. This method, however

is based on an assumption that the language of development, database connector and

database system support prepared statements. Primary assumption of this approach is

equivalency of data type of vulnerable code and data types of corresponding columns

in the database. In case of mismatching data types assumption is run-time module will

handle all type conversions whenever required .

SQL injection can be prevented by proper validation of the user input. Some web

frameworks handle this issue by distinguishing user input from the SQL query. For

example, Microsoft's .NET framework provides a mechanism called parametrized query,

which accepts the user inputs as parameters. This helps in separation of the user input


from developer-intended query and allows the database engine to identify malicious

inputs, thus preventing SQL injection.


Chapter 4

Proposed Approach: An Encoding-based


In this section we will provide a generic approach on encoding based technique to

prevent SQL injection attacks.

In database-enabled web-applications, SQL Queries are, in general, constructed by

concatenating an input string directly from the User. Through input string attacker

somehow manages to modify query structure. This query structure modification is

possible because both the query languages and input strings use same alphabet and

input strings are directly appended. Therefore one can put SQL keywords in input

strings and manages to modify query structure. What if we change the alphabet of input

string di erent from SQL. This way one can not change query structure if input string

has completely di erent alphabet than query language .

As we know that now-a-days many database systems are using unicode in order to

unifying the character set of di erent languages in an universal way []. Let U be the set

of unicode and  be a new alphabet. We can define the following function F which maps


any unicode value into a string of 


F : U ! 

The component-wise distributive property of F is defined as




2 : : : x


) = F(x


2) : : : F(x



As an example let us consider  = f0; 1g. Given a string 'abc', the unicode of it is

U(abc) = U(a)U(b)U(c). Therefore, the encoded representation of it in  = f0; 1g is obtained


Enc(abc) = F(U(abc))

= F(U(a)U(b)U(c))

= 011000010110001001100011

Now let's see how this helps in preventing injection attack. Consider the following


string Q=`` SELECT * FROM members WHERE username = ' '' +

$username + `` ' AND password = ` '' + $password + ``''';

Suppose the username and password entered are ' OR 1=1 and password respectively. The encoded version of inputs are:

Enc(' OR 1=1 ) = 010101010101010101010011001010001

Enc(password) = 100101110101010010100010100101010

Instead of appending the original inputs to the original query Q, we will append the


encoded representation in the language di erent from the SQL constructs as depicted


string query=``SELECT * FROM members

WHERE username =`010101010101010101010011001010001' AND

password = `010101010101010101010011001010001';

Observe that the semantics of Q after appending inputs in encoded form is not changed,

leading to a mitigation of the injection attacks. However, the issue arises here is that the

WHERE condition produces false positives as values are in a new language rather than


4.1 Extending encoding-based approach to database-applications

As we have seen how encoding helps in preventing SQL injection attacks. We now

discuss two major issues in case of database-applications:

1. Data storage and string comparison.

2. Transformation of traditional String Operations into semantically equivalent operations in the new language.

4.1.1 Data storage and string comparison

Consider the database showin in table 4.1. Suppose administrator wants to login by

Username Password

ADMIN admin

user 1234

Table 4.1

providing $username= Admin and $password = Admin. Appending inputs in the encoded


form results into the following query:

String query=``SELECT * FROM members

WHERE username =` 011000010111010101011011001010001' AND

password = `011000010111010101011011001010001'

where Enc(Admin)=011000010111010101011011001010001. As an enhancement to the

existing database systems when matching operation is performed over database data,

we can adopt one of the followings:

1. Rather than storing normal string Store its encoded value.

2. While comparing the database entries with input string convert database entries

into encoded value on a fly and then match with input string.

Encoded databases

To enable the matching operation, we can store encoded values of strings in the databases

rather than actual strings and and will decode it to its original form after performing all

operations at encoded-level. The encoded version of the database (table 4.2) as shown


It is to be observed that encoded version of database may occupy more storage space

Username(varbinary) Password(varbinary)

011000010111010101011011001010001 011000010111010101011011001010001

100100100101010010100101000010 101010101100101011001010101000

Table 4.2

than the original version, and therefore, may take more time on performing database

operations. Therefore, this might be suitable for small database systems only.


Conversion on Fly

Storing database in raw binary format doesnt seem convincing and can take too much

overhead in decoding. We can define similar encoding procedure at database side and

then can compare encoded Value of database entries with encoded input string .What

we are doing is we are comparing encoded value of database entries with encoded value

of input string becuase of there one to one mapping relationship .For encoded value

comparison we can convert unicode data values into encoded value on a fly rather than

storing it permanently.

Let us consider an example how this works. A generic login query would look something like this

string query = 'SELECT * FROM members WHERE databaseEncode(username) =

' ' ' + ApplicationEncode($username) + '' AND databaseEncode (password) = ' ' +

ApplicationEncode( $password) + ''';

Here databaseEncode is encoding function implemented at database layer while ApplicationEncode is same encoding function implemented at application layer. When

normal users tries to login he will be successful in logging in because there is one to

one correspondence between data entries and encoded values. Same can be said for

Unsuccessful trial of attack from attacker side due to oneone mapping.

4.1.2 Transformation of traditional String Operations into the semantically

equivalent operations

We want our encoding function to such that all the string operation should provide same

results in encoded domain as in normal domain. Before discussing further we should

look at concept called homomorphism. homomorphic encodingis a form of encoding


which allows specific types of computations to be carried out on encoded text and

generate result which matches the result of operations performed on the normal text.

Fig. 4.1

so basically we want our encoding to follow homomorphism property so that we

should get same results in encoded domain which were intended in normal domain.

Some of the traditional substring matching operations do not behave similarly in new

domain lets consider an example. Suppose we have to search name having a substring

BH. Lets say Encoding for BH is 0011001111001011 suppose we have a name CDE in

database say encoding for CDE is 110000110011110010110000.

Fig. 4.2

So we found a match which is incorrect .Problem is because match is not on byte

boundary. To solve this problem we can take any one of two steps described subsequently.

1) Use Delimiter


2)Use already defined data base string procedures for encoding at database layer.

4.1.3 Delimiter based encoding

We should redefine encoding function to introduce delimiter at byte Boundary. Because

delimiter is at byte boundary, string matching will require delimiter matching also

ensuring every match at byte boundary.


Now our alphabet has 3 symbols (0,1,;) But we Cant represent it with single bit so we

should again define mapping such that we can represent 0 1 and ; by combination of bit

0 and 1

Represent 0 by 00

Represent 1 by 11

Represent ; By 010


4.1.4 Use already defined procedures at database layer

We are using encoding function at database layer also. We can use already defined

procedure in database library such as Binary, Hex (if use hexadecimal encoding instead

of binary ) etc. these types of conversion automatically ensures that matching is done on

byte boundary.

Ex- A generic login query can be written something like this

string query = 'SELECT * FROM members WHERE BINARY(username) = '' ' +

Application Binary Encode($username) + '' AND BINARY (password) = ' ' + Application Binary Encode( $password) + ''';



string query = 'SELECT * FROM members WHERE HEX(username) = '' ' + Application HexaDecimal Encode($username) + '' AND HEX (password) = ' ' + Application

Hexadecimal Encode( $password) + ''';

Where HEX and binary are already define function in database library. Hex converts

string to hexadecimal string and BINARY convert string to binary string. Application

Hexadecimal Encode and Application Binary Encode are application layer function for

binary conversion


Chapter 5

A Working Example

In this chapter, we will illustrate our proposed technique step-by-step with a working


5.1 Complete technique with worked example

i) Define encoding function at Application layer

ii) Define encoding function at database layer or chose already defined function in

database library

iii) Encode user input before appending to query.

iv) Augment query such that it compares encoded user input with encoded database


ex- string query = 'SELECT * FROM members WHERE username = '' ' + $username + '' AND password = ' ' + $ password + ''';

step i) -Define Encoding function at application layer

HEXAD(String)- user defined string function converts string to Its hexadecimal .


Eg- HEXAD(abc)=616263;

Step ii) encoding function at database layer HEX(already defined in library)

Step iii) and iv)

string query = 'SELECT * FROM members WHERE HEX(username) = ' ' ' +HEXAD(

$username) + '' AND HEX(password) = ' ' + HEXAD($ password) + ' ' ';


Chapter 6

Experimental Results

A set of Benchmark JSP web applications with MySQL as the backend database were

chosen for experimental Analysis. Analysis was performed to estimate the e ectiveness

of our Approach.

Table (6.1) Describes the setup used such as the applications (on which technique was

applied), their size (Lines of Code), no of hotspots, no of vulnerable parameters. Line

of Code was measured using open source tool CLOC [19]. The web applications chosen

were benchmark problems online book store, employee directory, event manager, bug

tracker, online forum, online engineering portal, information portal.

6.1 Result Analysis

For injection and result monitoring tool called SQL Inject Me [20] was used.Table 3.2

describes the results.

6.2 Hypothesis Evaluation

The results demonstrated in this section 6.2 supplement the hypothesis that our approach

is ecient to prevent SQL injection attacks. It was able to prevent di erent variations of


Experimental Results


Description LOC No. of No. of

hotspots injectible parameters


Application for online 6982 13 44

book purchase


Application to maintain 2317 4 15

profile of employees


Application to manage 2883 8 26

and organise events


Online portal 6502 16 93

for engineers


Application to notify 2981 7 18

bugs of system


information 3269 7 29



Discussion 1690 3 7


Table 6.1


No. of Attacks Rate of No. of Rate of

vulnerable Detected/ false Good inputs flase

inputs injected prevented Negative injected positive

bookstore 51 51 0 53 0

book purchase

Empldir 50 50 0 52 0

profile of employees

Events 50 50 0 50 0

and organise events

Portal 50 50 0 50 0

for engineers

Bugtrack 50 50 0 50 0

bugs of system

YellowPages 50 50 0 50 0


Table 6.2


the attack, like tautology attack, piggy-backed at-tack, union-based attack and attack performed by injecting logically incorrect queries in the application. Also, the performance

overhead introduced by this approach was negligible. However, the tests performed

were restricted to an application which had only a few queries. It would have been very

interesting to observe the behavior of this approach in case of complicated queries or

queries which contained lots of tokens in the form of joins and select-list attributes. And

comparison of results with other available techniques.


Chapter 7

Complexity Analysis

Many Approached have been proposed while highly e ective, these approaches have

several limitations that a ect their ability to deploy them in practical applications for

preventing SQL injection attacks. There are several limitation e ecting deployment of

these techniques like Static analysis techniques address only a subset of the problem , do

not achieve the same levels of precision as dynamic techniques but reduces high runtime

overhead of Dynamic techniques. Other solutions require developers to learn and use

new APIs, modify their source code,some has limitations of completeness Defensive

coding techniques o ering e ective solution to injection attacks is dicult to apply

e ectively in practical applications because of selection of proper validation function .

Our approach is very much light weighted since it just encodes user input before

appending to query .Run time time includes encoding and query execution time thus

has little overhead of encoding which is very minimal (linear run time ).So this approach

can be deployed in practical application with ease.


Chapter 8


In this thesis, we have proposed a new encoding-based technique to prevent SQL injection attacks. Currently, our approach is able to prevent all first order injection such

as union-based attack, piggy-backed query based attack, tautology based attack and

logically incorrect queries based attack. The attack simulation for testing the e ectiveness and eciency of the approach was performed using already available tool

SQLInjectMe[20] which is written to test application with already available test data set

having both malicious inputs and benign inputs. However the tests performed were

restricted to benchmark applications which had only a few queries. It would have been

very interesting to observe the behavior of this approach in case of practical on-net

applications with large databases having complicated queries in the form of joins and

select-list attributes to get actual idea of complexity and overhead involved.







[1] Sruthi Bandhakavi, Prithvi Bisht, P. Madhusudan, and V. N. Venkatakrishnan.

CAN-DID : Preventing SQL Injection Attacks using Dynamic Candidate

Evaluations. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and

communications security, CCS '07, pages 12'24, New York, NY, USA, 2007. ACM.

[2] Stephen W. Boyd and Angelos D. Keromytis. SQLRand : Preventing SQL Injection

Attacks. In In Proceedings of the 2nd Applied Cryptography and Network

Security (ACNS) Conference, pages 292'302, 2004.

[3] Gregory T. Buehrer, Bruce W. Weide, and Paolo A. G. Sivilotti. Using parse tree

validation to prevent sql injection attacks. In In Proceedings of the International

Workshop on Software Engineering and Middleware (SEM) at Joint FSE and

ESEC, pages 106'113, 2005.

[4] Justin Clarke. SQL Injection Attacks and Defense. Syngress Publishing, 1st edition,


[5] Debasish Das, Utpal Sharma, and D.K. Bhattacharyya. An Approach to Detection

of SQL Injection Attack Based on Dynamic Query Matching. International Journal

of Computer Applications, 1(25):28'34, February 2010. Published By

Foundation of Computer Science.

[6] OWASP Foundation. Top 10 2013-a1-injection, June 2013.

[7] William G. J. Halfond, Jeremy Viegas, and Ro Orso. Classification of SQL Injection

Attacks and Countermeasures.

[8] William G.J. Halfond and Alessandro Orso. Preventing SQL Injection Attacks

[9] Haeng Kon Kim. Frameworks for SQL retrieval on Web Application Security. In

Pro- ceedings of the International Multiconference of Engineers and Computer

Scientists, volume 1, page 5, Hong Kong, 2010. IMECS, International Association

of Engineers.


[10] Diallo Abdoulaye Kindy and Al-Sakib Khan Pathan. A Detailed Survey on

Various Aspects of SQL Injection: Vulnerabilities, Innovative Attacks, and

Remedies. CoRR, abs/1203.3324, 2012.

[11] Microsoft. Microsoft code analysis tool .net ( v1 ctp - 32 bit.

http://www., 2013.

[12] Microsoft. Rngcryptoserviceprovider class. com/enus/library/ rngcryptoserviceprovider.aspx, 2013.

[13] Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP). Projects/OWASP Secure

Web Application Framework Manifesto/Releases/Current/Manifesto, November


[14] Ashok Singh Sairam Sangita Roy, Avinash Kumar Singh. Analyzing SQL Meta

char- acters and preventing SQL Injection attacks using meta filter. In

International Con- ference on Information and Electronics Engineering, ICIEE

2011, IACSIT Press, vol- ume 6, page 4, Singapore, 2011. Indian Institute of

Technology, Kalinga Institute of Industrial Technology, IACSIT Press.

[15] IBM GlobalTechnology Services.Ibm Internet Security Systems X- xforce-2008-annual-report.pdf.

[16] Stephen Thomas and Laurie Williams. Using Automated Fix Generation to

Secure SQL Statements. In Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on

Software Engineering for Secure Systems, SESS '07, pages 9'15, Washington, DC,

USA, 2007. IEEE Computer Society.

[17] Gary Wassermann and Zhendong Su. An Analysis Framework for Security in

Web Applications. In In Proceedings of the FSE Workshop on Specification and

Verifica- tion of Component-Based Systems (SAVCBS) 2004, pages 70'78, 2004.





Source: Essay UK -

About this resource

This Information Technology essay was submitted to us by a student in order to help you with your studies.

Search our content:

  • Download this page
  • Print this page
  • Search again

  • Word count:

    This page has approximately words.



    If you use part of this page in your own work, you need to provide a citation, as follows:

    Essay UK, An Encoding-Based Technique To Prevent Sql Injection Attacks. Available from: <> [27-05-20].

    More information:

    If you are the original author of this content and no longer wish to have it published on our website then please click on the link below to request removal: